

The Possibility

To: Constitutional Law

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Introduction

Since many penetrating volumes have been written on the nature of political power, **one** **may** well Inquire, what has been left unsaid? **The** answer is **that** the nature of power must be reconsidered from time to time in the light of the trends of social organization and of the human intelligence playing upon it. In recent years great masses of new material have been discovered in the fields of economics, anthropology, history, sociology, government, and these facts challenge the attention of those who are concerned with political authority. New doctrines of social environment, of social heritage, of personality are appearing to upset older conceptions and conclusion. Emerging psychiatric data, psychobiological facts regarding the nature of human personality are closely related to power complexes and attitudes.

Institutional changes of great meaning are also Occurring under the influence of science, technology, invention, both social and mechanical. **The Family**, The Church, the school, industry, agriculture, labor, are undergoing profound modification, and compelling reconsideration of earlier conclusions reached in the light of less adequate data.

The meaning as above mentioned has changed greatly and is apt to change in the future, but today we will look into 'power' from Max Weber's viewpoint starting with the concept.

Max Weber and His Work

Max Weber conceived of sociology as a comprehensive science of social action. In his analytical focus on individual human actors he differed from many of his predecessors whose sociology was conceived in social-structural terms. Spencer concentrated on the evolution of the body social analogous to an organism. Durkheim's central concern was with institutional

arrangements that maintain the cohesion of social structures. Marx's vision of society was informed by his preoccupation with the conflicts between social classes within changing social structures and productive relations.

In contrast, Weber's primary focus was on the Subjective meanings that human actors attach to their actions in their mutual orientations within specific social-historical contexts. Behavior devoid of such meaning, Weber argued, falls Outside the purview of sociology.

Four major types of social action are distinguished in Weber's sociology. Men may engage in purposeful or goal-oriented rational action (zweckrational); their rational action may be value-oriented (werirational); they may act from emotional or affective motivations; or, finally, they may engage in traditional action. Purposeful rationality, in which both goal and means are rationally chosen, is exemplified by the engineer who builds a bridge by the most efficient technique of relation means to ends. Value-oriented rationality is characterized by striving for a substantive goal, which in itself may not be rational—say, the attainment of salvation—but which is nonetheless pursued with rational means—for example, ascetic self-denial in the pursuit of holiness. Affective action is anchored in the emotional state of the actor rather than in the rational weighing of means and ends, as in the case of participants in the religious services of a fundamentalist sect. Finally, traditional action is guided by customary habits of thought, by reliance on “the eternal yesterday” the behavior of members of an Orthodox Jewish congregation might serve as an example of such action.

This classification of types of action serves Weber in two ways. It permits him to make systematic typological distinctions, as for example between types of authority, and also provides a basis for his investigation of the course of Western historical development. Raymond Aron rightly sees Weber's work as “The paradigm of a sociology which is both historical and systematic”

Weber was primarily concerned with modern Western society, in which, as he saw it, behavior had come to be dominated increasingly by goal-oriented rationality, whereas in earlier periods it tended to be motivated by tradition, affect, or value-oriented rationality. His Studies of non-Western societies were primarily designed to highlight this distinctive Western development. Karl Mannheim puts the matter well when he writes, "Max Weber's whole work is in the last analysis directed toward the question 'Which social factors have brought about the rationalization of Western civilization?' " In modern society, Weber argued, whether in the sphere of politics or economics, in the realm of the law and even interpersonal relationships, the efficient Implication of means to ends has become predominant and has replaced other springs of social action.

Earlier theorists had attempted to conceive of major historical or evolutionary tendencies of Western society in structural terms: for example, Toennies' conception involved a drift from Gemeinschaft (community) to Gesellschaft (purposive association); Maine's a shift from status to contract; and Durkheim's, a move from mechanical to organic solidarity. Weber responded to similar concerns by proposing that the basic distinguishing marks of modern Western man were best viewed in terms of characteristic shifts in human action that are associated with characteristic shift in the social and historical situation. Unwilling to commit himself either to a “materialistic” or an “idealistic” interpretation of history, Weber's ultimate unit of analysis remained the concrete acting person.

Interpretative sociology considers the individual and his action as the basic unit, as its “atom”

The individual is . . . the upper limit and the sole carrier of meaningful conduct. . . . Such concepts as “state,” “association,” “feudalism,” and the like, designate certain categories of human interaction. Hence it is the task of sociology to reduce these concepts to “understandable” action, that is Without exception, to the actions of participating individual men.

Weber's focus on the mutual orientation of social actors and on the “understandable” motives of their actions was anchored in methodological considerations, which account for much of the distinctiveness of his approach.

1. The Concept of Power

(1) Definition

R.M. Maciver - The capacity to control the behavior of others either directly or by fiat or indirectly by the manipulation of available means

Kaplan - The process of affecting policies of others with a help of actual or threatened severe deprivations for nonconformity with a policies intended

B Russel - The production of intended effects

H.I Lasswell - Participation in the making of decisions (an interpersonal relation)

Max Weber - The ability to achieve desired ends despite resistance from other.

(2) Examination of Weber's definition on power

Weber's concept of power can be built into the notion of Intention and Conflict.

< To achieve desired ends (intention + despite resistance from others (conflict)).>

Three fundamental element to the concept of power.

- Class : the outcome of the distribution of economic power
- Status : normatively defined a kin() of social power
- Party : political groups active in pursuit of various goals

More about class, status, and power

Weber differed only marginally from Marx when he defined as a class a category of men who (1) "have in common a specific causal component of their Life chances **in** so far as (2) **this** component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) it is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor market."

He was even fairly close to Marx's view, though not necessarily to those of latterday Marxists. when **He** stated that class position does not necessarily lead to class-determined economic or political action. He argued that communal class action will emerge only if and when "the Connections between the causes and the consequences of the 'class situation' " become transparent; Marx would have said when **a class** becomes conscious of its interests, that is, of its relation, as a class, to other classes. Yet, Weber's theory of stratification differs from that of Marx in that he introduced an additional category, that of "status groups"

Classification of men into such groups is based on their consumption patterns rather than on their place in the market or in the process of production. Weber thought Marx had overlooked the relevance of such categorization because of his exclusive attention to the productive sphere. **In** contrast to classes, which may or may not be communal groupings, status groups are normally communities, which are held together by notions of proper life-styles and by the social esteem and honor accorded to them by others.

Linked with this are expectations of restrictions on social intercourse with those notI belonging to the circle and assumed social distance toward inferiors. In **this** typology we again find Weber's sociological notion of a social category as dependent on the definition that others give to social relationships. A status group can exist only to the extent that others accord its members prestige or degrading, which removes them from the rest of social actors and establishes the necessary social distance "them" and "us,"

Empirically there are fairly high correlations between standing in the class and in the status order. Especially in capitalist society, the economically ascendant class will, in the course of time, also acquire high status, yet in principle, propertied and propertyless people may belong to the same status group. At certain times, an economically weak element, such as the East Elbian Junkers, may exercise considerable influence and power because of its preeminent status. Generally, as much post-Weberian analysis of American politics has shown, political behavior may at times be influenced by men who are fearful of losing their status or who bridle at not having been accorded a status they think is their due; such influence may be as powerful as class-determined modes of political behavior

In Weber's view every society is divided into groupings and strata with distinctive life-styles and views of the world, 'just as it is divided into distinctive classes. While at times status as well as class groupings may conflict, at others their members may accept fairly stable patterns of subordination and superordination.

With this twofold classification of social stratification, Weber lays the groundwork for an understanding of pluralistic forms of social conflict in modern society and helps to explain why only in rare cases are such societies polarized into the opposing camps of the "haves" and the "have-nots." He has done much to explain why Marx's exclusively class-centered scheme failed to predict correctly the shape of things to come in modern pluralistic societies.

In regard to the analysis of power in society, Weber again introduces a pluralistic notion. Although he agrees with Marx in crucial respects, he refines and extends Marx's analytical scheme. For Marx, power is always rooted, even if only in the "last analysis," in economic relations. Those who own the means of production exercise political power either directly or indirectly. Weber agreed that quite often, especially in the modern capitalist world, economic power is the predominant form. He objects that, "the emergence of economic power may be the consequence of power existing on other ground" For example, men who are able to command large-scale bureaucratic organizations may wield a great deal of economic power even though they are only salaried employees.

Weber understands by power: the chance of a man, or a number of men "to realize their own will in communal action, even against the resistance of others." He shows that the basis from which such power can be exercised may vary considerably according to [the] social context, that is, historical and structural circumstance. Hence, where the source of power is located becomes for Weber an empirical question, one that cannot be answered by what he considers Marx's dogmatic emphasis on one specific source. Moreover, Weber argues, men do not only strive for power to enrich themselves. "Power, including economic power, may be valued 'for its own sake.' Very frequently the striving for power is also conditioned by the social 'honor' it entails."